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ABSTRACT
Rangwala, Mohammed M. M.S., Purdue University, May 2014. Secure Digital Prove-
nance: Challenges and a New Design. Major Professor: Xukai Zou.
Derived from the field of art curation, digital provenance is an unforgeable record
of a digital object’s chain of successive custody and sequence of operations performed
on the object. It plays an important role in accessing the trustworthiness of the object,
verifying its reliability and conducting audit trails of its lineage. Digital provenance
forms an immutable directed acyclic graph (DAG) structure. Since history of an
object cannot be changed, once a provenance chain has been created it must be
protected in order to guarantee its reliability. Provenance can face attacks against
the integrity of records and the confidentiality of user information, making security an
important trait required for digital provenance. The digital object and its associated
provenance can have different security requirements, and this makes the security of
provenance different from that of traditional data.
Research on digital provenance has primarily focused on provenance generation,
storage and management frameworks in different fields. Security of digital provenance
has also gained attention in recent years, particularly as more and more data is mi-
grated in cloud environments which are distributed and are not under the complete
control of data owners. However, there still lacks a viable secure digital provenance
scheme which can provide comprehensive security for digital provenance, particu-
larly for generic and dynamic ones. In this work, we address two important aspects
of secure digital provenance that have not been investigated thoroughly in existing
works: 1) capturing the DAG structure of provenance and 2) supporting dynamic
information sharing. We propose a scheme that uses signature-based mutual agree-
ments between successive users to clearly delineate the transition of responsibility of
xii
the digital object as it is passed along the chain of users. In addition to preserving the
properties of confidentiality, immutability and availability for a digital provenance
chain, it supports the representation of DAG structures of provenance. Our scheme
supports dynamic information sharing scenarios where the sequence of users who have
custody of the document is not predetermined. Security analysis and empirical re-
sults indicate that our scheme improves the security of the typical secure provenance
schemes with comparable performance.
11 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we give a brief introduction about digital provenance and our work
in this thesis.
1.1 What is Digital Provenance?
Provenance refers to the origin or earliest known history information of an object.
The concept of provenance originates from the field of art and archiving, where it
refers to information about the artifact’s creation, the chain of custody and modifi-
cations performed on it. It has been an important concept in many fields other than
art, like science and computing where it is used to trace an object to its origin. It is
used in work-flow management systems and processes in physics, astronomy, biology,
chemical sciences, earth sciences for maintaining context information, auditing and
data replication [1]. It finds applications for intelligent re-use of experiments, fault
detection, protection against illegitimate intellectual property claims, detecting pla-
giarism and identity fraud, and assessments of data quality [2]. Depending on the
application domain, different properties of the object can be tracked such as owner
information, purpose of its creation, processes undergone, state of the object or ma-
terial at each stage, etc. Since provenance maintains information about the present
and past of an object, it is suitable to assess the object’s trustworthiness [3].
Digital provenance is the provenance associated with digital objects which can be
resources in hardware, software, documents, databases and other entities. It main-
tains information about the chain of successive custody of the object with different
users and the sequence of operations performed on it. It can store functional data such
as the process results as well as non-functional data such as the performance of each
2step. Most computer systems track information for error correction and debugging,
as discussed in [4], such as:
i) Operating systems store logs of important system events which help in system
administration and intrusion detection.
ii) File systems store information about file creation, modifications performed, per-
missions to the file, etc.
iii) Version Control Systems record information about the modifications made to
different objects.
iv) Web browsers store history information about the web pages visited and when.
These can be considered as different forms of provenance information, which are
application specific. However, each of these systems does not provide a definition for
provenance.
Digital Provenance finds applications in a number of areas [5]. Some of them are:
i) Verification of scientific data and experiments [6–14];
ii) Supporting or facilitating data sharing [15–18];
iii) Copyright clearance [19];
iv) Legal proceedings involving data [20];
v) Tracking operations on data in cloud environments [21–23];
vi) Recently in facilitating data mining [24]; tracing system activities in Android
devices [25]; stream management [26,27];
Provenance systems are specially designed application-specific frameworks used
to collect, analyze and store all metadata information of an object. They can then be
queried to obtain the history information, perform audits and validation checks and
detect faults. Research in provenance has focused on developing such frameworks for
3a variety of systems like work-flow management, grid computing, file systems, cloud
systems. We mention some of these in Chapter 3.
Digital provenance introduces some challenges with respect to its definition, man-
agement and security [4]. Some of these challenges are:
i) Completeness: Since provenance contains history information, it is necessary to
define how much recorded information is considered to be enough. Depending
on the application, it maybe necessary to record the output of each individual
operation performed on the object. This is important because completeness of
the provenance will define the complexity of a provenance system.
ii) Reliability: Provenance must be reliable since it finds applications in fault detec-
tion, identity theft and plagiarism detection, etc. It is necessary for the prove-
nance to be secure against any kind of tampering after it has been created.
iii) Heterogeneity: A digital object can undergo several operations that may pro-
duce different meta-data information. It may also be recorded at different levels
of granularity. Thus, provenance can contain heterogeneous information which
introduces the challenge of uniform consistent representation.
iv) Portability: Since provenance is associated with a digital object, it must be
bound to it. As the object moves in the system, its provenance must move along
with it. This requires the provenance to support portability in the system.
v) Dynamic nature: Different users may operate on the digital object at different
points in its lifetime. In a distributed information network or wireless sensor
network, the sequence of nodes through which the object passes is predetermined
(to a certain extent). But in different scenarios, it may be possible that the
sequence is dynamic. The structure of the provenance and the provenance system
itself must be able to support this.
Provenance can be represented as a causality graph that connects different objects
with edges that describe the process by which the object transformation took place
4[28]. This forms an immutable directed acyclic graph (DAG) structure. Although an
object keeps changing with operations performed on it, its history information does
not and so, provenance is immutable. The DAG structure is justified since an object
can be copied to multiple instances (or provided as input to multiple processes) and it
can be created from a combination of objects (or from outputs of multiple processes).
In a graph, these cases represent a node having multiple children or multiple parents
respectively. Since history inforamtion does not repeat, the graph does not have any
cycles. There is no established standard for representing provenance information,
but XML is most popularly used [1]. The existing limited security mechanisms for
provenance do not appropriately apply to DAG structures.
Depending on the application domain, provenance can be more or less sensitive
than the data object itself. For e.g., in an employee review system, the sequence
of managers who have added to the review must not be disclosed to the employee.
Thus, the ownership information in the provenance chain in such a scenario must
be kept confidential. Here, the provenance is more sensitive than the document it
is associated with. Consider another example of a professor’s recommendation for a
student’s university application. The recommendation document itself needs to be
kept confidential from the student, but the provenance containing the information of
the professor(s) can be disclosed. In such a scenario, the document is more sensitive
than its provenance. Apart from this, like other information security subjects, digital
provenance requires integrity and availability, along with suitable and efficient repre-
sentation. In this respect, the security requirements of provenance differ from those of
traditional data [28]. Thus, a general scheme for secure provenance is needed, which
can be modified depending on the application scenario.
Recent research in provenance has focused on developing provenance generation,
storage and management frameworks in different fields but limited work has focused
on the security and privacy issues related to it. We recognize that two aspects have
not gained enough attention: 1) capturing the DAG structure of provenance and 2)
supporting dynamic information sharing. In this work, we propose a scheme that uses
5signature-based mutual agreements between successive users to secure the provenance
chain. It is an interactive protocol that clearly delineates the transition of responsibil-
ity of the digital object as it is passed along the chain of users. A related provenance
scheme was proposed by Hasan et. al. [29]. This scheme is referred to by Wang et.
al. [30] as the Onion scheme due to its layered provenance format. They showed that
the Onion scheme has certain weaknesses and proposed a linked chain structure of
provenance using public keys. This scheme is referred to as the Public-Key Linked
Chain (PKLC ) scheme [30]. The PKLC scheme works well for distributed informa-
tion systems but cannot handle all the properties required in other digital systems.
Our solution extends their work and solves the problems associated with it.
1.2 Main Contributions of this thesis
The contributions of our work can be summarized as:
• A signature-based mutual agreement scheme is proposed to form links between
provenance records. Our scheme provides better security than the Onion scheme
[29], and, is an extension and improvement over the PKLC [30] scheme to
provide secure provenance in digital systems other than distributed information
networks.
• Our scheme can adequately support the representation of DAG structures of
provenance.
• It can also support dynamic information sharing scenarios where the next user
to whom the data will be passed is not predetermined. A summary of the
advantages of our scheme is provided in Table 4.1.
• An analysis of the security of our scheme is provided to show that it satisfies
the security requirements of a provenance scheme.
• Experimental evaluations are provided for the overhead of our scheme. The
overhead of our scheme for provenance record creation is a little more than the
6other schemes but we argue that it can be outweighed by the security provided
by our scheme. The results show that it performs better than the Onion scheme
for provenance chain verification.
1.3 Organization of this thesis
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we discuss the
fundamental concepts involved in a provenance scheme, the important properties
required for its security and an attack model that must be considered. We highlight
the previous proposed mechanisms in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 describes our mutual
agreement signature scheme, along with an example and discusses its properties. We
analyze the security of our scheme with respect to the attack model in Chapter 5.
Performance evaluation and comparison with existing schemes is provided in Chapter
6. Chapter 7 talks about future work and concludes the thesis.
72 PRELIMINARIES FOR A SECURE PROVENANCE SCHEME
In this chapter we describe and provide definitions for some fundamental concepts
related to digital provenance. We discuss the different entities involved in a secure
provenance scheme; the security properties required from it; and a general attack
model for building a secure provenance scheme.
2.1 Entities involved
A document D is a data item such as a file, database tuple or network packet for
which provenance is to be generated and maintained. In this work we use the term
document abstractly; its exact form is domain and application-specific.
Provenance of a digital document is an account of all the actions performed on it
right from the point of creation. Each access to the document can create a provenance
record Pr ; multiple such records are maintained in order as a provenance chain
Pr1|Pr2|. . . |Prn. Provenance of a document forms a directed acyclic graph (DAG)
structure [28]. We refer to the provenance of the document as a ‘chain’ in this work
because records are arranged sequentially, but they may not be linearly linked to each
other. A provenance record stores in it an account of the operations performed by a
user on the document, and relevant information that help maintain links between the
different records that are part of the chain.
Users are the entities who have or have had custody of the document. They may
perform operations on the documents, e.g. create, rename, read, write, delete in the
case of a file system. The user who first creates the document and is associated with
the first record of the provenance chain is referred to as the owner of the provenance.
This is different from the current owner of the document. In this work we refer to
owner as the owner of the provenance chain.
8An auditor is an entity who can check all provenance information to verify the
lineage of a document. An auditor performs an auditing activity, which involves
traversing the provenance records in the chain and checking their fields to ensure that
the chain has not been tampered with. Different users may trust different auditors
with sensitive information, thus, a document has a set of auditors who can access
different sensitive fields in the records.
Outsiders are entities who do not have access to the documents, and subsequently
should not have access to any part of its provenance.
An adversary has access to the provenance and wants to alter it in some way
for malicious intents but remain undetected. An adversary may be a user who has
already contributed to the provenance chain or an outsider.
2.2 Properties of a provenance scheme
After discussing the fundamental entities, we discuss the properties that a scheme
must provide for the provenance data. Groth et. al. [31] identified a set of properties
that any provenance system must provide. We list them here:
i) Verifiability: The provenance scheme must be able to verify a process with respect
to the users involved, operations performed and results obtained.
ii) Accountability: The scheme must hold the user accountable for his/her actions,
i.e. a user should not be able to repudiate any actions.
iii) Reproducibility: The provenance should contain enough information for it to be
possible to reproduce the same results if the sequence of operations recorded is
re-executed.
iv) Preservation: Since provenance contains history information, it must be main-
tained for a sufficiently long period of time.
v) Scalability: For large scale applications, a large amount of provenance data may
be generated which requires the scheme to be scalable.
9vi) Generality: It is possible for a wide variety of meta-data to be generated from
an application and the provenance scheme should be general enough to be able
to capture them.
vii) Customizability: The scheme must allow customization to be able to record any
application-specific details at different levels of granularity.
viii) Portability: Provenance is associated with a digital object, and there must be a
mechanism to ensure that they cannot be separated. Along with this, the scheme
must allow the provenance to move in the system when the data moves.
We now discuss the properties that a scheme must provide for securing the prove-
nance chain which are more related to our work. These are extended from the fun-
damental general properties of data security. We mention the properties here to get
an understanding of the security required for a provenance chain and discuss how our
scheme achieves them in Section 4.3.
Confidentiality: A provenance record may contain sensitive information regard-
ing the operations performed on the document as well as its ownership history that
should not be revealed to unauthorized entities. The sensitivity of these fields is do-
main and application-specific. For e.g., in an employee review system, the sequence
of managers who have added to the review must not be disclosed to the employee.
Thus, the ownership information in the provenance chain in such a scenario must be
kept confidential. This is different from the confidentiality of the document itself.
Thus, provenance and the document may have different confidentiality requirements.
The properties that are required are:
i) An auditor should be able to verify the complete lineage of the document, without
access to the sensitive information in the records.
ii) Since different users may trust different auditors, the sensitive information may
not be revealed to all auditors.
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Integrity: Since provenance contains history information which is immutable,
integrity of the provenance is the most important property that a scheme must satisfy.
There are three types of integrity associated with provenance [30]:
i) Immutability (Chain Integrity): The provenance chain once formed should not
be modifiable, i.e. the order of the records cannot be changed.
ii) Data Integrity: The information in the individual provenance records should not
be tampered with.
iii) Non-repudiation (Origin Integrity): A user’s action in the chain cannot be un-
done, i.e. the user cannot repudiate his actions.
Availability: Provenance is associated with a document and when it is passed
between users, the provenance chain is passed along with it. The scheme must ensure
that when the document is passed between users, the chain remains intact and is not
modified without being detected in the auditing activity.
Efficiency: Depending on the application domain, the provenance generation
process and scheme participates either when operations are being performed on the
document (when outputs of individual operations must be recorded) or after all op-
erations have been performed. In both cases, the provenance scheme adds a compu-
tational overhead on the application. The scheme must be designed such that the
overhead is not significant.
As seen in this discussion, the representation and properties of provenance can
be different can be different from those of the document it is associated with. Each
individual provenance record can have different confidentiality requirements, whereas
the integrity and availability of all records in the chain must be protected as the
chain grows. This introduces new challenges in the security of provenance, making it
different from the security of traditional data.
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2.3 Attack Model
Here we briefly discuss some of the goals of the adversary in a digital provenance
scheme similar to discussions in [29, 30]. A detailed analysis of attacks and their
prevention in our scheme is discussed in Chapter 5. A provenance scheme must
consider an adversary with the intentions of,
i) obtaining confidential information from the provenance records about the oper-
ations performed on the document;
ii) obtaining information about the ownership history of the document;
iii) using fake or stolen key-pairs to make their own provenance records un-verifiable;
iv) modifying existing records (tampering or changing order of records) or adding
forged information to the existing provenance chain;
v) selectively removing a certain part of the preceding provenance chain.
Our scheme should be designed such that these goals are either prevented or made
detectable to an auditor in the auditing activity.
These preliminaries lay the foundation for understanding the existing work done
in secure digital provenance (Chapter 3) as well as our scheme (Chapter 4).
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3 BACKGROUND & RELATED WORKS
Before discussing our scheme in detail, we discuss some of the research that has been
conducted with respect to the security of digital provenance and give an insight into
the motivation for our work.
Research has been done to develop conceptual frameworks and models for prove-
nance management [11, 13, 14, 31–42]; to identify the security requirements of prove-
nance systems [4, 5, 43] and provenance management and data forensics in cloud en-
vironments [21–23,44–47].
Hasan et. al. [20] were among the first to propose the concept of secure provenance.
Although provenance had been studied in many applications and fields, they identified
that the security issues had not been considered. They defined the properties required
from a secure provenance scheme along with a threat model and challenges. Braun
et. al. [28, 48] discussed some of the essential characteristics of provenance and how
it is different from other data in terms of security. They were among the first to
recognize that the provenance graph is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) structure to
which traditional security measures cannot be directly applied.
Kairos [2] is an architecture for securing the data authorship and temporal in-
formation in provenance records suited for work-flow-based grid computing environ-
ments. It uses techniques from public key infrastructure (PKI) such as certificate
authorities, digital signatures and time stamping protocols to protect provenance
records. Kairos has a centralized architecture involving a certificate authority and a
time stamp authority, which in combination are responsible for time stamping and
signing a provenance record for user of the grid application. The architecture aims
at protecting the provenance record but does not give details about the structure of
the record itself.
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Sultana et. al. [49, 50] proposed a lightweight method for detecting provenance
forgery in wireless sensor networks. Since such systems are power and memory con-
strained it is necessary for the provenance management to be efficient in storage
and transmission and not be computation intensive. In this scheme, they use bloom
filters to encode provenance information to be able to detect packet drop attacks.
Sultana et. al. also proposed a method to securely transmit provenance information
in streaming media [27]. Though these works are not directly related, they consider
some of the characteristics of confidentiality and integrity preservation required by
our scheme.
Alharbi et. al. [51] proposed a privacy-preserving data provenance scheme to
ensure the security of provenance for documents on remote servers. The main focus
of the scheme is to preserve the privacy of the users through the use of hash chains and
group signature techniques, and employs the use of a trusted authority and trusted
servers. Our scheme makes use of only a trusted auditor but is not focused at remote
document operations.
3.1 The Onion scheme
The Onion scheme [29, 52] is closely related to our work. In this section, we give
a brief overview of this scheme and discuss its shortcomings.
3.1.1 Overview of the scheme
The Onion scheme was the first to define a concrete structure of a provenance
record. Each individual provenance record in a chain of records has the following
structure:
Pri = < Ui, Oi, h(Di), Ci, publici, Ii >
We limit our discussion of the fields of the records in this chapter, since they will be
elaborated in Chapter 4 when we discuss our scheme. Here, U contains the user’s
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information, O is a representation of the operations performed on the document, h(D)
is the hash of the document, C is the checksum of the record, public stores a public
key certificate of the user and I contains keying material. Multiple such records
arranged sequentially form the provenance chain. The checksum field also contains
the checksum of the previous record in the chain and this makes it an incremental
chained signature mechanism. Each record uses the checksum signature over the
previous record’s signature to preserve the integrity of the complete chain. Since
the checksum field is layered, it gives the chain an onion-like structure [30]. The U
and O fields may contain sensitive information. They can be kept confidential using
symmetric keys with auditors, which are stored in I.
3.1.2 Problems with the scheme
The Onion scheme has certain weaknesses [30]. First, it cannot protect the out-
ermost layers of the provenance chain, i.e. the newest records. An insider attacker
can easily extract a prefix of the complete chain, sign over the signature of the last
record in the extracted chain and insert a new record. The flaw comes from the fact
that this scheme is not based on a hand-off mechanism when the document is passed
between users. Consecutive records in the chain are loosely linked to each other.
Second, the scheme requires the trusted auditor(s) to maintain user-key relation-
ship which violates the confidentiality of the users. Our scheme involves a ChainInfo
field in the provenance record, which sequentially stores the public keys of all users
involved in the preceding chain. This field provides the keys necessary to perform the
operations with the records, but does not reveal any identity information of the users
even to the trusted auditor(s).
Also, the scheme cannot support the DAG structure of provenance. It is restricted
to the scenario of a single document being passed along a chain of users. Our scheme
overcomes these weaknesses by introducing a mutual agreement mechanism, when the
document is passed between users, which creates strong links between their prove-
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nance records. It also uses multiple fields for signatures to handle the case of multiple
parents or children in a DAG structure.
3.1.3 Scheme related to the Onion scheme
Syalim et. al. [53] proposed a scheme based on the Onion scheme. In this scheme,
every document and its provenance passed between users is signed by the previous
user as well as the owner of the provenance to preserve the integrity of the chain.
They define a path-based policy as well as a compartment policy for providing access
control on the provenance graph structure. The provenance records are encrypted
using multiple keys that are handled by the provenance owner.
The shortcoming of this scheme is that it makes use of the involvement of the
provenance owner to satisfy the properties of the system. This heavy involvement
of the owner at each step of the provenance scheme is undesirable. This is avoided
in our scheme, through a mutual agreement mechanism between only the users who
are involved in passing the document at a particular time. Also, a large number of
encryption and signature operations are performed which make the scheme inefficient.
3.2 The PKLC Scheme
The Public-Key Linked Chain (PKLC) scheme [30] is most closely related to our
work. We give a brief discussion of this scheme.
3.2.1 Overview of the scheme
The PKLC scheme [30] is based on advancements to the Onion scheme applied
to a distributed information network. It uses a record format similar to that of the
Onion scheme, and has the following structure:
Pri = < Ui, Oi, h(Di), Si, PubKeyi, Ci >
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Though the fields of the PKLC scheme are originally named differently, here we use
the same notations as those of the Onion scheme for convenience. The structure is
suited for distributed information networks or wireless sensor networks. U is similar
to that of the Onion scheme where it stores information about the node performing
operation on the document. O contains information of every individual operation that
is performed on the document by the same node. h(D) is the hash of the document and
S, similar to the I field stores symmetric keys used to encrypt sensitive information.
C contains the signature of the node over the complete record. The scheme differs in
the manner in which it links records of the chain. A record can contain the previous
and next user’s public keys in the PubKey field to link the records.
3.2.2 Problems with the scheme
The links between the records are weak since they are formed with only the public
keys of the users. This scheme is suitable for distributed information or wireless sensor
networks where each user initially knows the identity of the next user to which the
document passes. In such a scenario, the weak links are enough to preserve the
integrity of the chain. The auditors know the path of information flow among users
and can thus verify the chain of records. But this cannot be applied directly to
dynamic information sharing scenarios where the next user is not predetermined.
Our scheme builds on this drawback of the PKLC scheme. It does not require the
identity of the next user to be known, but ensures the integrity by having the users
engage in a mutual agreement scheme at the moment when the document is passed
between them.
To denote the owner of the provenance chain, the first record contains the public
key of the owner in the previous field as well. If applied to a general scenario, it is
susceptible to an owner forgery attack. An adversary can remove the records of the
chain and claim to be the owner by creating a record with his/her own public key
in the previous field. Thus, a stronger mechanism is required for representing and
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distinguishing the owner of the provenance from other users. Our scheme handles
this by involving the auditor.
We have now laid the foundation for a secure provenance scheme and discussed
previously proposed provenance schemes along with their shortcomings. We now
discuss our proposed design in the next chapter.
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4 MUTUAL AGREEMENT SIGNATURE SCHEME
In this section we present our scheme for secure digital provenance.
4.1 Assumptions of our scheme
Before we discuss our scheme in detail, we mention our assumptions.
i) Our scheme considers only the format of the provenance records and chain. It
does not focus on the storage and maintenance of the chain. Storage systems
such as PASS [33], Flogger [35] can be used for this purpose.
ii) The provenance generation and storing mechanism is not compromised. Our
scheme focuses on securing the provenance from attacks after it has been created
and stored securely.
iii) The keys used for signatures and encrypting the fields are never compromised or
revoked.
iv) The document and its provenance are inseparable, i.e. when a document is
passed, the provenance chain is also passed with it. This must be maintained by
the provenance storing mechanism.
v) Our scheme relies on transitive trust defined in [30]. That is, pairs of users
involved in the document passing trust each other. Thus, we assume that con-
secutive pairs of users do not collude.
4.2 Structure of provenance record and chain
The provenance chain is composed of a sequence of individual provenance records.
Each record stores fields that contain information about the user, operations per-
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formed, chain of custody of the document thus far, and a representation of the pre-
vious and next users in the chain. It has the following structure:
Pri = <Ui, Oi, h(Di), ChainInfoi, S
∗





Figure 4.1 gives a representation of the structure of the the provenance chain and
each individual provenance record for the scheme. Each of the fields of a record is
explained as follows.
Ui contains identity information about the user i who creates this provenance record.
This information is specific to an application domain. For a file system prove-
nance record, Ui includes user ID, process ID, ipaddress, port, host, time, and
so on.
Oi gives a representation of the sequence of operations or modifications performed on
the document by user i. This is also dependent on the application domain. For
the file system provenance record, Oi includes a file diff, log of changes or oper-
ations, or any other reversible representation [29]. It can also contain subfields
for representing the operations performed by different processes under the same
user as in [30]. Oi contains a reversible representation of the operations if the
application domain supports it. By reversible we mean that given document Di
and Oi, it is possible to obtain Di−1.
Ui and Oi contain information about the identity of the user and the operations
performed, which may be sensitive to the application. They may be encrypted, in
which case the Si is used.
h(Di) is the cryptographic hash of the contents of the document Di after user i
performs all operations. A hash function is a one way function that is almost
always unique for different documents. As the document is modified along the
chain, a hash in each record uniquely represents the state of the document at
that instant.
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ChainInfoi is a representation of the chain of custody of the document tracked
from its origin. It is a sequence of the public keys of all users involved with this
document from the owner of the document U1 to the current user Ui represented
as KAud|K1|K2|. . . |Ki. KAud is the public key of the auditor, who must begin
the provenance chain. The purpose of KAud will become clear in the further
discussion.
S∗i stores symmetric keys that may be used to encrypt the sensitive Ui and Oi fields.
We adopt the broadcast encryption scheme of [29] to regulate the access for
different auditors. Instead of creating multiple encrypted versions of the sen-
sitive fields for each auditor, user i encrypts them with a symmetric key Ks,
and then stores copies of Ks encrypted with the keys KAudj of the respective
auditors. The ∗ indicates there may be zero or more symmetric keys depending
on whether encryption is required and the number of auditors user i trusts.
Ci is the digital signature over the fields of the same record i signed by the user Ui
with key K−i , represented as:
Ci = signi(Ui, Oi, h(Di), Si)
Since the private key is confidential to a user, assuming it is not stolen, it
is not possible to forge the signature of user i. The signature over the fields
< Ui, Oi, h(Di), Si > ensures the integrity of the record.
P+i is the previous digital signature field which is a representation of the previous
provenance record in the chain. The + indicates there may be more than one
previous provenance record from different provenance chains. For the first user
U1 in the provenance chain, this field is signed by the auditor with key K
−
Aud.
N∗i is the next digital signature field which is a representation of the subsequent
provenance record in the chain. The ∗ indicates there may be zero or more
subsequent provenance record for a split into different provenance chains.
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KAud | K1 | K2 | … | Ki
Pr1 Pr2
U1 U2 Ui Un-1 Un
Provenance Chain
Prn-1 PrnPri
Figure 4.1. An illustration of the structure of provenance
The P+ and N∗ fields are crucial for linking the different provenance records into
a chain and for easing the verification process. They form the basis for the mutual
agreement scheme. These fields are explained as:
For record i :
Pi = signi−1(h(Di−1), ChainInfoi−1|Ki, Ci−1)
Ni = signi+1(h(Di), ChainInfoi|Ki+1, Ci)
For record i+1 :
Pi+1 = signi(h(Di), ChainInfoi|Ki+1, Ci)
Ni+1 = signi+2(h(Di+1), ChainInfoi+1|Ki+2, Ci+1)
It can be seen that the N field of record i is signed by user Ui+1. The P field
of record i+1 is signed by user Ui. User Ui after creating provenance record Pri
passes the document to the user Ui+1 who can then create the record Pri+1. An
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Algorithm 1 Provenance record creation steps
1: User i creates record Pri:
2: Pri =< Ui, Oi, h(Di), ChainInfoi, S
∗





3: if i = 1 then . User 1 is the creator of the document
4: U1 ← eS1(User 1 Information)
5: O1 ← φ . U1 is the creator of the document
6: h(D1)← Hash of document created D1
7: ChainInfo1 ← KAud|K1
8: S1 ← eAud(KS1) . Multiple for different auditors
9: P1 ← signAud(IV,KAud|K1, C1) . Auditor creates unique IV for this
document
10: N1 ← φ
11: C1 ← sign1(U1, O1, h(D1), S1)
12: else . User i gets the document from user i-1
13: ChainInfoi ← ChainInfoi−1|Ki
14: Pi ← signi−1(h(Di−1), ChainInfoi, Ci−1)
15: Ni−1 ← signi(h(Di−1), ChainInfoi, Ci−1)
16: User i modifies document Di−1 to Di
17: Ui ← eSi(User i Information)
18: Oi ← eSi(Operations performed)
19: h(Di)← Hash of modified document Di
20: Si ← eAud(KSi) . Multiple for different auditors
21: Ni ← φ









Update U, h(D), ChainInfo,
S fields





Add provenance record to 
the chain
Update U, O, h(D),
ChainInfo, S fields









Figure 4.2. Flowchart of a user’s actions for creating a provenance record
agreement is signed by both users, such that the record Pri contains the signature of
Ui+1 and Pri+1 contains the signature of Ui. As can be seen, the fields Ni and Pi+1
hold signatures over the same data which is the agreement between the users. The
agreement between users Ui and Ui+1 consists of the fields:
<h(Di), ChainInfoi|Ki+1, Ci>
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It indicates that the user Ui passes a document having hash h(Di) to Ui+1, the
sequence of users in the history of the document including Ui+1 is ChainInfoi|Ki+1,
and Ci is the representation of the actions performed by h(Di). The agreement is
an interactive hand-off mechanism where user Ui passes the document to user Ui+1
and claims to have passed the provenance intact. It delineates the transition of
responsibility of the document from user Ui to Ui+1.
The previous field for the first user in the provenance chain is signed by the auditor
with key KAud and contains an initialization vector IV in the hash field which is known
to the auditor. This IV is unique for each provenance chain. The purpose of IV and
the P1 field signed by the auditor is to prevent an owner forgery attack which is
discussed in detail in Chapter 5. IV is a place filler for the hash field, but is not
required.
The steps followed by a user for creating a provenance record are described in
Algorithm 1. It can be seen that the provenance record is constructed incrementally,
the fields are created at each step when the user obtains the document, performs
operations and passes it to the next user. Figure 4.2 shows a flowchart of the steps
followed by a user for creating a provenance record. The user follows different courses
of actions depending on whether he/she is creating the document, or is obtaining the
document from another user. As can be seen, in both cases a mutual agreement takes
place either with the auditor (if the user creates the document) or with the previous
user (when the user receives the document).
4.3 Properties satisfied by our scheme
We briefly analyze our scheme for the properties discussed in Section 2.2.
Confidentiality: The information contained in the provenance records may be
required to be kept confidential, for e.g., proprietary algorithms, identity of the user,
etc. which are stored in the U and O fields. These fields need to be kept acces-
sible only to the trusted auditor or group of trusted auditors. One approach is to
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encrypt multiple of copies of U and O with different keys for each trusted auditors.
However, this leads to a large number of copies of the data. Instead, we achieve the
confidentiality by using the broadcast encryption scheme of [29]. The U and O fields
are encrypted using a unique symmetric key Ks generated for the record. Multiple
copies of this key are then encrypted each with the key of a different trusted auditor.
The S field in the provenance record stores encrypted versions of the symmetric keys.
This scheme reduces the number of encrypted copies of the data to be maintained,
by maintaining multiple copies of the key instead. This encryption ensures that the
information in the U and O fields is only accessible to the owner of the provenance
record and the auditor(s) he/she trusts. No other entity should be able to access
them.
Integrity: It is required that any attacks on the provenance chain, such as tam-
pering of the content of the records, addition or removal of records from the chain
should be detected by an auditor while performing the auditing activity. In order to
facilitate this, our scheme uses hashes and signature fields to hold users accountable
for their actions. Our scheme has the following mechanisms to provide the three types
of integrity we have discussed:
i) The current signature C is a representation of the actions performed by the user
on the document. It protects the fields of the same record providing the property
of data integrity.
ii) The previous P and next N signature fields form the mutual agreement between
users that links the provenance records of the chain when a document is passed.
This provides chain integrity.
iii) Since each record contains the N field, a user’s actions in the agreement are
signed by the next user as well. This provides origin integrity i.e. a user cannot
repudiate his/her actions.
iv) The previous field of the first record is signed by the auditor and the agree-
ment contains a unique initialization vector. This is done to protect the chain
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against an owner forgery attack where another user claims to be the owner of
the provenance chain.
Availability: A provenance chain must remain intact when it is passed between
users along with the document. Through the use of mutual agreements and current
signature fields, the scheme ensures that the provenance chain remains intact and
any modifications or malicious activity can be detected in the auditing process. The
mechanisms for providing confidentiality and integrity indirectly also provide the
property of availability. An auditor can perform auditing as per the steps in Algorithm
2, which is discussed in Section 4.5.
Our scheme relies on transitive trust among users. That is, it relies on the as-
sumption that when a document is passed between two users, the users trust each
other and do not collude. Our scheme can prevent collusion between users as long as
they are not consecutive in the chain. However, if consecutive users collude to modify
their provenance records, it is possible for the records to have appropriate signatures
for the agreement signature fields. This change can go undetected in the auditing
process. Consider the following scenario: Users A, B, C and D are successive users in
the provenance chain of a document. After B has created the record, it is passed to C.
Assume B and C collude to change the operations B performed on the document. In
such a case, B can change the representation of OB, h(DB) and the current signature
CB. The mutual agreement between B and C contains C ’s signature over NB. Since
they collude, it is possible for them to change the mutual agreement to reflect their
malicious changes and sign over them. This change will go undetected in the auditing
activity. Our scheme does not prevent this scenario of successive users colluding.
A thorough security analysis of our scheme with respect to the attack model is
provided in Chapter 5. As shall be seen, maintenance of these properties helps prevent
different attacks on the provenance records and chain.
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4.4 Example scenario
The mutual agreement signature scheme is better explained referring to a scenario
as shown in Figure 4.3. Each user along the chain follows the provenance record













Figure 4.3. An example of document passing
The user A first creates the document D1.
A is the creator of this document and the owner of its corresponding provenance












The operations field OA is empty, because A is the owner and creator of the document
D1. The next field NA is currently empty, because A has not yet passed the document
to another user. The field UA can be encrypted using symmetric key KSA , and KSA
can then be encrypted using KAud and stored in SA. This preserves A’s confidentiality.
The previous field PA is signed by the auditor and contains a unique initialization
vector (IV) in the hash field known only to the auditor.
A passes the document D1 to user B .








It contains only the previous field PB and ChainInfoB field at the beginning:
PB = signA(h(D1),KAud|KA|KB,CA)
ChainInfoB = KAud|KA|KB
The next field NA of PrA is also created as:
NA = signB(h(D1),KAud|KA|KB,CA)
As can be seen from these two fields, the signatures use the same data fields as
agreement. It delineates the transition of responsibility of D1 from A to B.
B now modifies the document D1 to D2.
B preforms operations OB to modify the document. UB and OB can be encrypted
using symmetric key KSB , and KSB can then be encrypted using KAud and stored in
SB. We ignore the encryption further in the example, since it remains the same for




The next field NB remains empty, because B has not yet passed the document to
another user.
B passes the document D2 to C .












B passes document D2 to user D .














As can be seen, the data in the signatures is identical to that of the previous fields
PC and PD which shows the separate agreements for the two chains.
Consider that C modifies document D2 to D3, and passes it to user E. The fields
of record PrC are updated and PrE is created as:
CC = signC(UC,OC,h(D3),SC)








PE = signC(h(D3),KAud|KA|KB|KC |KE,CC)
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D modifies D2 to D4 and creates the fields of the record PrD and the current signature:
CD = signD(UD,OD,h(D4),SD)
E modifies document D3 obtained from C to D5 and creates the fields of the record
PrE and the current signature:
CE = signE(UE,OE,h(D5),SE)
F obtains documents D5 from E and D4 from D .
In this case, the record PrF is created such that the previous field PF has two subfields
to indicate the two separate provenance chains. The next fields of the two users ND
and NE are also updated:







ChainInfoF = KAud|KA|KB||KB–KC–KE–KF |KB–KD–KF ||
PF = signD(h(D4),KAud|KA|KB|KD|KF ,CD);
signE(h(D5),KAud|KA|KB|KC |KE|KF ,CE)
ND = signF (h(D4),KAud|KA|KB|KD|KF ,CD)
NE = signF (h(D5),KAud|KA|KB|KC |KE|KF ,CE)
Again, it can be seen that the data used in the signatures for the subfields of PF and
the fields ND and NE are the same, indicating the separate agreements for the two
chains. In the field ChainInfoF , the sequences of public keys from the two branches
is concatenated and the order is indicated by the – and || symbols. The order is also
preserved in the two previous signature fields.
4.5 Auditing activity
An auditor performs auditing on the provenance chain to verify that the chain
has not been tampered with. The steps followed by an auditor to verify the integrity
of the provenance chain are discussed in Algorithm 2. Auditing takes place in reverse
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Algorithm 2 Provenance chain auditing steps
1: Auditor ← Pr1|Pr2| . . . |Prn;Dn . Auditor receives the provenance chain and
document Dn
2: H ← h(Dn) . Auditor constructs hash of Dn
3: Verify: Prn[h(Dn)] = H
4: for all Pri ∈ Prn|Prn−1| . . . |Pr1 do
5: W ← DecryptKi(Ci) . Verifying the current signature field
6: X ← h(Ui, Oi, h(Di), Si)
7: Verify: W = X
8: if Pi = P1 then . Previous field of record Pr1 involves the auditor
9: Y ← DecryptKAud(Pri[Pi])
10: Z ← h(IV,KAud|K1, C1)
11: Verify: Y = Z
12: end if
13: for all Pr′j ∈ Pri[Pi] do . For each previous field
14: Y ← DecryptKj(Pri[P ji ]) . Decrypting previous signature field of Pri
corresponding to Pr′j
15: Z ← DecryptKi(Pr′j[N ij ]) . Decrypting next signature field of Pr′j
corresponding to Pri
16: Verify: Y = Z
17: end for
18: end for
order starting from record Prn up till the first record Pr1. This is different from the
verification in the Onion and PKLC schemes. The reverse order is used to be able to
verify DAG structures where multiple individual chains may exist.
The auditor first checks if the hash of the current document matches the hash
stored in the record Prn. If this verification fails, either the document or the record






H ← Hash of document
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Figure 4.4. Flowchart of a auditor’s actions for auditing a provenance
chain
check if the current record is intact and that the agreements with the previous and
next users are intact. For checking the current record, the auditor computes the
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hash of the fields < Ui, Oi, h(Di), Si > in the record. Then he checks this hash with
the current signature Ci of the record. The agreements between pairs of records are
checked by verifying the previous and next signature fields along the chain. To do
this, the previous field Pi of every record is checked with the next field Ni−1 of the
previous record. The verification is done by computing the agreement i.e. the hash of
the fields < h(Di−1), ChainInfoi, Ci−1 > and checking it with the stored signatures
in the fields Pi and Ni−1.
If the current field verification fails for record Prj, there can be two cases:
i) if the agreement between Prj and Prj−1 is intact, the record Prj has been
tampered with, or,
ii) if this agreement is not intact, then the current fields and agreements of previ-
ous records must be checked till a record Prk is found where the current field
verification fails, but agreement is intact. In such a case that record has been
tampered with.
Similarly, if the agreement verification between records Prj and Prj−1 fails, the
auditor must check the current fields and agreements of previous records till a record
Prk is found where the current field verification fails, but agreement is intact. In such
a case that record has been tampered with.
If there is a verification failure at any stage, the auditor (or set of auditors with
appropriate symmetric keys of the records) can decrypt the operations fields Oi of
the records to reconstruct the document backwards to its original form. This is
possible since Oi contains a reversible representation of the operations performed on
the document. With this, each of the verifications can be performed again, to identify
the exact instance in the history when the document or its record was tampered with.
Any user who can verify the initialization vector used in the previous signature field of
the first record can successfully perform auditing of the complete chain. Other users
can verify the integrity of the chain beginning from the second record. However, only
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an auditor can decrypt the symmetric keys stored in the record to further decrypt
the U and O fields.
Figure 4.4 shows a flowchart of the steps followed by the auditor for auditing the
provenance chain. The steps are similar to our discussion here. However, for the sake
of simplicity of the flowchart, when any verification fails, the auditor enters the state
’Verify previous records’ in which the verification of the remaining records up along
the chain is performed to identify the cause of the verification failure.
In our scheme, each record is related only to its previous and next records. Unlike
the Onion scheme, where every record contains the checksum information of the
complete preceding chain, our scheme involves agreements with only pairs of records.
Although Algorithm 2 involves checking the nodes sequentially from the last to the
first, the verification can be conducted concurrently for pairs of records along the chain
similar to the PKLC scheme. If all records are intact, this improves the verification
process. If the verification fails for a particular pair of records, the preceding chain
can then be investigated following the process described.
4.6 Advantages of our scheme
We can see that the provenance records in our scheme are linked together into a
chain (actually DAG) structure through the previous and next signature fields which
serve as the mutual agreements between records. The scheme is simple to implement
and has many advantages over the schemes discussed in Chapter 3. A summary of
these advantages is given in Table 4.1.
First, it provides better protection than the Onion scheme against selective re-
moval of provenance records from the chain. In the Onion scheme, records are loosely
linked only in the forward direction, and a record does not contain any information
about who the next or previous user(s) is. So, if an adversary receives a chain of
records Pr1|Pr2|. . . |Prn, he/she can selectively remove part of the chain Pri|. . . |Prn,
append a new record Pri with the signature over the signature of record Pri−1 and
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remain undetected. Our scheme overcomes this drawback by introducing next and
previous signature fields which cannot be forged. A record Pri contains the signatures
of users Ui−1 and Ui+1, thus selectively removing a part of the chain as in the case
of the Onion scheme will cause the record Pri−1 to still contain the signature of the
original user Ui. Every user has proof of his/her actions, as well as the actions of the
previous user, and contains information about the next user who the document gets
passed to. This case is further explained in Chapter 5.
Second, our scheme does not require a trusted auditor(s) to know the user-key
relationship as in the Onion scheme. This maintains the confidentiality of the users,
and also makes the auditor a simpler entity. In fact, any user who can verify the
initialization vector used in the previous signature field of the first record can suc-
cessfully perform auditing of the complete chain. Other users can verify the integrity
of the chain beginning from the second record. However, only an auditor can decrypt
the symmetric keys stored in the record to further decrypt the U and O fields.
Third, our scheme can also support the DAG structure of provenance. As seen
in the provenance record structure, each record contains previous P+ and next N∗
signature fields. Multiple fields signed by different users can be incorporated in these
as indicated by the + and ∗ symbols. Thus, our scheme can support DAG structures
as part of the record structure itself. While provenance storage is not our concern in
this work, we mention that storing a DAG structured provenance as a linear sequence
of records (not linearly linked) would require a topological sorting mechanism [54].
The PKLC scheme requires auditors to know the sequence of users in the infor-
mation flow. Every node also knows the next node to which the data must be passed.
This allows the scheme to link the records only using the public keys of the users
in the chain. But it also restricts the scheme to the scenario where the sequence
of nodes is predetermined. If the sequence of nodes is dynamic, the auditor in the
PKLC scheme cannot verify the integrity of the chain. Also, if the PKLC scheme
is applied directly to a dynamic scenario, it is susceptible to successful tampering of




































































































































































































































































































































a dynamic information sharing scenario. This is made possible by the mutual agree-
ments between users which contains enough information for an auditor to verify the
sequence of users and integrity of the chain without knowing the sequence beforehand.
In the PKLC scheme, the first record contains the public key of the creator of the
document in the previous field. If applied to a general scenario, this weak scheme is
susceptible to an owner forgery attack, where an adversary can remove the records
and claim to be the creator of the document by making a record with his/her own
public key in the previous field. Our scheme prevents this by having the auditor sign
the previous field of the first record. It also involves using a unique initialization
vector IV that only the auditor knows. This ensures that an adversary cannot claim
to be the owner of a document without having the auditor’s signature and using a
fake IV.
In the Onion scheme and the PKLC scheme, the corresponding current signature
field signs over all the fields of the record. In our scheme, however, the current
signature field only involves the fields < Ui, Oi, h(Di), Si >. It does not sign over
ChainInfo. This is because ChainInfo is protected by the P and N fields. The mutual
agreements protect the information about the sequence of users. This reduces the
overhead of signing over all fields of the record. The current field is, thus, concerned
only with the fields specific to that particular record.
We conclude this chapter by briefly summarizing the discussion. The mutual
agreement signature scheme is an interactive protocol between users along the chain
of custody of the document. We discussed the structure of the provenance chain and
record, illustrated it with an example, described the auditing activity and mentioned
the advantages of our scheme over existing works. We shall now analyze the security
provided by our scheme in the next chapter.
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5 SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this Chapter, we discuss how our scheme prevents the attacks from adversaries
discussed in Section 2.3. We discuss propositions of attacks from an adversary and
give a discussion about how our scheme prevents them.
The following proposition considers the attack on the confidentiality of the
provenance:
Proposition 1. An auditor can verify the integrity and availability of the chain but
not access any of the confidential information in the records.




i> fields of every
record in the chain to perform the auditing. The user information U and operations
O fields are encrypted using a unique symmetric key Ks generated for the record.
Multiple copies of this key are then encrypted each with the key of a different trusted
auditor. The S field in the provenance record stores the encrypted versions of the
symmetric keys. This encryption ensures that the information in the U and O fields
is only accessible to the owner of the provenance record and the auditor(s) he/she
trusts. No other entity should be able to access them.
The following propositions consider the attacks on the integrity of the provenance
records and chain:
Proposition 2. An adversary cannot claim that a valid provenance chain belongs
to another document having different contents.
Each record Pri contains a field h(Di) that stores the cryptographic hash of the
document corresponding to that record. Also, the user Ui signs h(Di) along with
other fields in the current Ci signature field, giving an account of his/her actions.
Suppose an adversary Ui takes the provenance chain of document D1, attaches it to
another document D2 and passes it to user Uj, there can be three scenarios:
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i) Uj will verify that the h(D2) 6= h(D1) from the last record in the chain. Thus,
Uj will know that the provenance chain does not belong to D2.
ii) If Ui changes h(D1) in the last record to correspond to h(D2), but the record
does not belong to Ui, it is not possible for Ui to forge the current signature field
C of the last record. This will be detected by Uj.
iii) If the last record does belong to Ui, and Ui can change the hash and current
signature fields of the last record to correspond to document D2, it will not be
possible for Ui to forge the records in the preceding chain. This will be detected
in the auditing activity.
Thus, it is not possible for an adversary to associate a provenance chain with another
document.
Proposition 3. An adversary cannot alter the fields of records from the preceding
chain without being detected.
Every record Pri in the chain contains a field for the current signature Ci which
establishes that the signer Ui with private key K
−
i is the creator of that record. This
signature cannot be forged by another user. Thus, even if an adversary alters the
fields of a record Pri, the signature of the fields <Ui,Oi,h(Di)> will not match Ci
when auditing is performed. Thus, any alteration of the fields in the preceding chain
can be caught in the auditing activity.
Proposition 4. An adversary cannot add fake records into the beginning or middle
of the chain without being detected.
Each record in the provenance chain has previous Pi and next Ni signature fields.
These, along with the ChainInfo field, represent the chain of successive custody of
the document.
The first record of the owner of the document has the previous field signed by
the auditor using the key K−Aud. Since this signature cannot be forged, an adversary
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cannot add fake records into the beginning of the chain since the signature will not
be that of the auditor. If the adversary attaches the first record of another chain to
the beginning of this chain, the case is similar to Proposition 2.
If fake records are added to the middle of the chain, the previous and next fields
must by signed by the appropriate users of the chain to maintain the order of the
mutual agreements. Consider the chain contains consecutive records Pri and Prj.
Then Ni is signed by user Uj and Pj is signed by user Ui. If an adversary wants to
add a record Prk between Pri and Prj, Ni must be signed by Uk and Pk signed by Ui.
Similarly, Nj must be signed by Uk and Pj signed by Uk. This is not possible since
the signatures of Ui and Uj cannot be forged.
Proposition 5. An adversary cannot remove records from the beginning or middle
of the chain without being detected.
Arguments similar to those in Proposition 4 hold for the case when records are re-
moved from the beginning or middle of the chain. If the first record is removed, the
new first record must have the previous field signed by the auditor. Since signatures
cannot be forged, it is not possible for the new first record to have the signature of
the auditor. Suppose we have the records Pri, Prj and Prk as consecutive records in
the chain. If an adversary removes the record Prj, in the new chain Ni must be signed
by user Uk and Pk signed by Ui. Similarly, Nj must be signed by Uk and Pj signed
by Uk. This is again not possible since signatures cannot be forged. Thus, it is not
possible for the adversary to remove records without being detected in the auditing.
Proposition 6. An adversary cannot alter the order of records from the preceding
chain without being detected.
This argument is a combination of Propositions 4 and 5. Altering the order of records
can be thought of as multiple operations of removal and addition of records into the
provenance chain. The P and N signature fields of the altered records will not have
the appropriate signatures according to the sequence of users in the chain.
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Proposition 7. An adversary cannot remove all the records of the chain and claim
he/she is the owner of the document by creating a new chain.
The first record of the owner of the document has the previous field signed by the
auditor using the key K−Aud. Since this signature cannot be forged, an adversary
cannot remove all preceding provenance records and claim to be the owner of the
document.
Proposition 8. Two colluding adversaries already having records in the chain can-
not add or remove records of other users between their records.
Consider a provenance chain Pr1|. . . |Pri|. . . |Prj|. . . |Prn. Two colluding adversaries
Ui and Uj may want to remove records between their records in the chain, such
that the resulting chain is Pr1|. . . |Pri|Prj|. . . |Prn. To be successful, the records Pri
and Prj must have appropriate signatures in the previous and next fields, which is
possible in the case of collusion. However, the records must also be updated such
that the hashes of the documents at each stage and the operations fields Oi satisfy
the reversibility criteria. If Oi is encrypted, this will become difficult to achieve. The
case is more difficult when adversaries want to add records of other users between
their records. In such a case, the signatures in all the fields must align, which can
again be difficult to achieve.
Proposition 9. An adversary cannot repudiate any records in the provenance chain.
Each user Ui in the chain must use his/her private key K
−
i to sign the current field Ci
of the provenance record Pri. This field serves as the digital signature that no other
user can forge. The signature is on the data fields Ui, Oi and h(Di) which essentially
represent the actions performed and results obtained by the user. If the record Pri is
not the last record, the user Ui must use the same key K
−
i to sign the previous field
Pi+1 of the next record Pri+1. If the user Ui is not the owner of the chain, the next
field Ni−1 of the record Ui−1 must also be signed in this way. The involvement of user
Ui in the chain is captured not only in the record Pri, but also in the previous and
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next records Pri−1 and Pri+1 respectively. Thus, after user Ui has created record Pri,
he/she cannot repudiate the record.
The following proposition considers the attack on the availability of the prove-
nance records and chain:
Proposition 10. An adversary cannot modify the document without adding the ap-
propriate provenance record in the chain and not being detected.
The mutual agreement procedure is followed when the document is passed from user
Ui to Ui+1. Thus, if the user Ui+1 modifies the document without appending the
appropriate record in the chain, the record Pri still contains the signature of user
Ui+1. Thus the involvement of Ui+1 cannot be repudiated.
Also, every provenance record Pri stores the operations Oi performed by the user.
This contains a reversible representation of the operations, such that if document Di−1
is modified to Di, Di−1 can be obtained from Di using Oi. Also, record Pri−1 stores
the hash h(Di−1). If an adversary performs operations on Di that are not recorded in
Oi or modifies Di and does not add an appropriate record to the chain, the previous
document Di−1 cannot be recovered such that its hash is the same as h(Di−1) stored
in record Pri−1. Simple auditing would not require the document to be reconstructed
in reverse; however it can be done to resolve discrepancies.
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6 IMPLEMENTATION & EVALUATION
Provenance generation results in an overhead in time as well as space that must be
considered apart from the security it provides. In this Chapter, we give an evaluation
of the overhead of our scheme and compare it with the Onion and PKLC schemes.
We implemented the three schemes with Java JDK 1.7 to measure and compare
their performances. The programs were executed using NetBeans IDE 7.4 on a Win-
dows 7 machine with Intel Core 2 Duo E6550 2.33GHz processor and 4.0 GB main
memory. Since the provenance transmission and storing are not our concern in this
work, we simulate the users on the same machine and simulate their activities by
modifying the document each time it is passed between users. Since our focus is to
measure the performance of the provenance generation process and not have it af-
fected by file I/O, we store the provenance records as nodes in a linked list in memory
instead of generating an XML document. We use 1024 bit RSA for digital signatures
and well as asymmetric encryptions, 128 bit AES for symmetric encryptions, and
SHA-1 as our hashing function. We choose four different files 5Kb (text document),
50Kb (text document), 500Kb (JPEG image) and 5Mb (JPEG image) to compare
the performance against varying file sizes.
The overhead for creating and auditing the provenance chain can vary depending
on the data included in each of the provenance records. We run our experiment under
the following settings:
i) Each user appends a small amount of information to the file as an operation on
it. This ensures that the file size does not change significantly while its hash
value does. Since the actual operations performed on the document are not our
concern, this suffices for our experiment.
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ii) Each user trusts the same auditor, and thus the symmetric key used to encrypt
the U and O fields, is encrypted using the public key of only one auditor.
iii) For the purpose of the experiments, every user operates on the data only once,
however, our scheme allows a user to be repeated in the provenance chain.
6.1 Provenance Record Construction
In the first experiment, we compare the performance of the three schemes for the
process of creation of a provenance record. We consider two aspects of the record
construction: the overall time required to construct a record and, the overhead of
individual operations involved in each scheme.
6.1.1 Time to create a record and overhead over other schemes
We measure the time required by each of the schemes to create a single provenance
record. We run this experiment 50 times for each of the varying file sizes and report
the average computation time. Figure 6.1 shows the results of the experiment. As
expected from the experiments in [30], the PKLC scheme performs better than the
Onion scheme. Our Mutual Agreement signature scheme takes longer to construct a
record.
The Onion and PKLC schemes each uses two hash operations (one for the file and
the other for the current signature field). Our scheme on the other hand uses four
hash operations (two additional for the previous and next fields). It also uses RSA
signatures for each of the agreements. As a result, our scheme has a comparatively
larger overhead of 97% over the PKLC scheme and 74% over the Onion scheme.
However, as the file size increases, we observe that the overhead reduces and becomes
comparable to the performance of the PKLC (7.18% overhead) and Onion schemes
(3.22% overhead). Figure 6.2 shows the percentage overhead of our scheme over the
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Figure 6.2. Percentage overhead of Mutual Agreement Signature scheme
over the Onion and PKLC schemes
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6.1.2 Overhead of individual operations of the schemes
We observe that the overhead of our scheme reduces as the file size increases and
becomes comparable to the performance of the Onion and PKLC schemes. The time
required by each individual operation performed in record creation we measured to
understand this. Each of the scheme uses the following operations in record creation:
i) RSA signature: The C, P and N fields each use RSA signatures.
ii) AES encryption: The U and O fields are encrypted with AES using a symmetric
key.
iii) RSA encryption: The symmetric key is then encrypted using RSA with the key
of the auditor.
iv) File Hash: This is the SHA-1 hash of the document.
v) Field Hash: This is the SHA-1 hash used before the signature can be applied to
the C, P and N fields.
vi) Self Time: The process of record creation also involves minor operations other
than the cryptographic operations. They are accounted for as self time of the
record generation process.
We find that the performances become comparable because, as the file size in-
creases, the overhead of the file hash operation alone dominates over the overhead
of the other operations. This is illustrated by the Figures 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 which
indicate the time required by each individual operation for different file size for the
three schemes.
From the figures, it is also seen that the RSA signature takes a larger percentage
of the total time in our scheme. This is because our scheme uses RSA signatures for
the mutual agreements. This operation is not present in the other schemes.
We argue that the security provided by our scheme and support for dynamic
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6.2 Provenance Chain Auditing
In the next experiment, we measured the time required for an auditor to audit an
entire provenance chain. We run this experiment for files of size 50Kb and 5Mb, each
for varying number of records in the chain. Each complete chain verification process is
run 10 times and we report the average computation time required. We first generate
a linear chain of provenance records by using the same process as in the previous
experiment and then perform verification. Since the Onion scheme does not support
DAG structures, we experiment with a linear chain to compare the performances of
the three schemes.
6.2.1 Concurrent auditing over the chain
In the Onion scheme every record contains the checksum information of the com-
plete preceding chain and the verification must take place sequentially along the chain.
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In the Mutual Agreement Signature scheme and the PKLC scheme, each record is
related only to its previous and next records. Our scheme involves agreements with
only pairs of records. Since it does not require an auditor to go sequentially over the
complete chain from the start, the verification can take place concurrently for pairs
of records along the chain. We use mutliple auditor threads to verify pairs of records
along the chain for our scheme and the PKLC scheme.
Figure 6.6 shows the results of auditing the provenance chain for a file of size
50Kb run on chains with increasing numbers of records. Our scheme takes longer to
verify than the PKLC scheme since it employs two more hashes. However, it performs
better than the Onion scheme, since we do not need to go sequentially over the chain.
For the 50Kb file, the improvement in performance over the Onion scheme becomes
significant as the length of the chain increases. The difference grows slower for the
5Mb file as seen in Figure 6.7. This is because the hash of the file again dominates over
the time required by other operations. Since the verification for our scheme and the
PKLC scheme happens concurrently over different records, it would be expected that
the time required remains fairly constant despite the length of the chain. However,
we see an increase in the time in both experiments. We attribute this to the overhead
of creating and managing threads in Java.
6.2.2 Sequential auditing over the chain
In the previous experiment, we performed the auditing concurrently for pairs of
records along the chain for the PKLC scheme and our scheme. In order to compare the
performances of the three schemes in the same setting, we run a similar experiment
performing auditing sequentially over the chain with only one auditor thread.
Figure 6.8 shows the result of auditing the provenance chain for a file of size 50Kb
run sequentially on the chains with increasing number of records. Our scheme takes
longer to verify than the Onion and PKLC schemes. This is expected, since our
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Figure 6.6. Provenance chain verification time in all three schemes for file
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Figure 6.7. Provenance chain verification time in all three schemes for file
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Figure 6.8. Provenance chain verification time in all three schemes for file


























Mutual Agreement Signature scheme Onion scheme PKLC scheme
Figure 6.9. Provenance chain verification time in all three schemes for file
sizes 5Mb (using sequential verification)
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over the other operations while performing auditing. In the previous experiment, the
overhead of the extra hash operations is reduced since they are performed concur-
rently. We also observe that the PKLC scheme also takes longer than the Onion
scheme in the similar setting. This is because the PKLC scheme needs to verify the
public keys stored in the records in addition to the signature field. In the sequential
auditing, this operation introduces the overhead which is not present in the Onion
scheme. The difference in the times grows larger as the number of records increases.
This is expected since two hash operations per pair of records increases. Figure 6.9
shows the same experiment run for a file of size 5Mb. The different in time grows
slower, since the hash of the file again dominates over the time required by the other
operations. However, we see an increase in the time in both experiments.
6.3 Argument of security over performance
It can be seen from the experiments and our evaluation that our scheme com-
promises on the performance as compared to the Onion and PKLC schemes. As the
file size increases, the performance for provenance record generation becomes com-
parable to that of the other schemes. For provenance verification, the performance
is better than that of the Onion scheme. The difference in performance is due to
the operations performed for creating the previous and next signature fields. These
fields are the basis of the mutual agreement scheme. As discussed in Section 4.6, they
overcome the shortcomings of the other schemes and provide better security to the
provenance chain. We thus argue that the advantages of our scheme i.e. providing a
representation for DAG structures of provenance, better security and supporting dy-
namic information sharing between users, outweighs the performance overhead seen
in Figures 6.1 and 6.2 for record construction, and in Figures 6.8 and 6.9 for sequential
provenance chain auditing.
We conclude this chapter by briefly summarizing the discussion on the experimen-
tation. The performance of our scheme against that of the Onion and PKLC schemes
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was evaluated, for the cases of provenance record construction and chain auditing.
Our scheme performs better that the Onion scheme for the case of concurrent chain
auditing. We observe an expected performance overhead for record construction and
linear chain auditing due to the additional operations involved in our scheme, but
argue that the security provided outweighs this overhead.
54
7 CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
Provenance is meta-data that stores the history of an object and it has unique security
requirements. Since history of an object cannot be changed, once its provenance is
created, the integrity and availability of the provenance records and the confidentiality
of user information contained in them must be protected. In this work, we proposed
a signature-based mutual agreement scheme that delineates the transition of respon-
sibility of a document when it is passed from one user to the other. We investigated
dynamic information sharing and representation of DAG structures of provenance,
which are two aspects not thoroughly looked at in recent research. The provenance
format and verification process in our scheme was discussed and an analysis of its
security assurance was provided. We gave experimental results of the overhead of
our scheme for provenance creation and verification. The overhead for provenance
creation is a little more than that of the PKLC and Onion schemes, but it provides
better security, whereas our scheme performs better than the Onion scheme for chain
verification. Section 7.1 briefly discusses some application scenarios for our scheme
and Section 7.2 talks about some of the future work related to this research.
7.1 Applications scenarios for our scheme
The mutual agreement signature scheme proposes a structure for the provenance
record and chain for a digital object. We use generality while defining the fields
in the record in order to support different types of applications. As discussed be-
fore, user information and operations on the object are application specific and they
may have different representations depending on the domain. However, our scheme
can support these since the fields are generally defined to work for any kind of rep-
resentation. Also, our scheme captures the properties, such as DAG representation,
55
integrity of individual records and the complete chain, which are common to all forms
of provenance. We discuss some of the application scenarios here.
The scheme can be applied to employee review and recommendation systems. A
document is passed between different employees, managers, teachers, etc. at differ-
ent security levels and hierarchy. The document and provenance may have different
sensitivity depending on the application and our scheme can support these scenarios.
We club all such application scenarios as academic information sharing. Another sce-
nario is a distributed application running instances on multiple nodes such that they
incrementally process the data moving towards a sink. This is similar to a wireless
sensor network, but encompasses a wider range of applications that can also include
industrial pipelined processes. Our scheme can be applied for provenance generation
in work-flows of industrial processes and grid based computing applications. In such
scenarios, users maybe computer processes, sensor nodes or even industrial mecha-
nized processes, which can have different representations in the provenance records.
Wireless sensor networks are typically resource constrained and since our scheme em-
ploys computationally expensive operations, it may not be best suited for wireless
sensor networks.
7.2 Future Work
Typical provenance schemes similar to our work in this thesis depend on transitive
trust among users. A challenge that they face is the detection of collusion of users
that are successive in the chain. In our future work we will look into a solution for
detecting collusion of successive users. Another aspect is that our scheme requires a
trusted auditor to prevent owner forgery cases and to access confidential information
of provenance records. One direction of research is to reduce/remove the involvement
of the trusted auditor and develop the scheme such that the users are the only entities
involved. One possible way is to use Hierarchical Access Control (HAC) schemes such
as [55] for efficient key management. In such a scheme, the creator of the document
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is at the top of the hierarchy. This can remove the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
required by most existing provenance schemes. However, it also introduces challenges
of maintaining the desired security properties for the records and the chain. We will
also work towards reducing the overhead of our scheme even further, by either em-
ploying faster algorithms, or by changing the procedure for mutual agreements. In
addition, we will implement our scheme in a real world information sharing applica-
tion, similar to ones discussed in the previous section and carry out a more thorough
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